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JAMES D. COX* 
HERBERT S. WANDER** 
A toast to the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA), and especially its 
forefathers, on its 60th Birthday! Now at age 60, the MBCA is still vibrant, 
meaningful, and it forms the bedrock for the health of the United States 
corporate economy. 
When we first considered assembling a compilation of articles in Law and 
Contemporary Problems to celebrate the 60th Anniversary, we had no idea of 
the scope, scholarship, depth, and historical importance these articles would 
present—a real treasure trove. Moreover, and very importantly, they chart a 
course for future deliberations of the Committee on Corporate Laws to address. 
A number of themes emerge from these articles. A central theme is that 
there is nothing as constant as change. Since 1950, the MBCA has undergone 
constant revisions and, in many instances, been the leader or catalyst for 
improvement in corporate law. 
These articles reflect not only the history of the MBCA and its 
achievements, but carefully analyze the relationship of the MBCA with 
Delaware Corporate Law and the American Law Institute’s Principles of 
Corporate Governance. There are obvious differences in these three, but the 
articles demonstrate that these tensions are both healthy and drive each to 
strive for greater effectiveness. The contrast between statutory specificity and 
judge-made corporate law are also examined and the positive and negative 
aspects of each dissected. 
The MBCA’s contributions to jurisprudence, appraisal remedies, duty of 
disclosure, financial provisions, confidentiality, indemnification, fiduciary duties 
of officers and directors, legal capital, and exculpation are chronicled, and 
serious recommendations are made on how they can be improved. 
The work of the Committee in the area of corporate governance is also 
impressive. The various editions of the Corporate Director’s Guidebook, 
published by the Committee, have had a substantial and affirmative impact on 
the development of corporate governance beginning with its then unheard of 
recommendation that non-management directors constitute a majority of the 
board of directors of publicly-held corporations. As a number of the articles 
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reflect, open issues in the corporate governance arena still exist and they point 
the Committee to the continued exploration of, among others, the publicness of 
public corporations, the roles of shareholders and directors, and the 
communications between boards, management, and shareholders. Now, some 
specifics about the articles celebrating sixty years of the MBCA. 
Not surprisingly, many of the contributions to this symposium focus on the 
orientation drafters should maintain in proposing corporate statutes that will 
stand, as the MBCA has, the tests of time. Drawing on insights from 
evolutionary economics and game theory, David McBride reflects on the 
contributions of corporation law, and particularly the role of statutes such as the 
MBCA. He concludes that although legislatures must allow on-going 
experimentation with new forms of business organizations, that 
experimentation must proceed with a healthy respect that a strong duty of 
loyalty is a central pillar to the social success of any corporate entity law. In the 
vein of experimentation and adaptation, Lisa Fairfax traces the MBCA’s ability 
to nimbly keep pace with the ever-accelerating developments of shareholder 
activism—for example, majority vote, shareholder access, and broker voting. 
Even though shareholder initiatives are occurring in fairly rapid fire and 
dramatically changing the corporate landscape, her review reflects that the 
drafters of the MBCA have responded with relative alacrity with provisions that 
wisely accommodate the shifting landscape.  
Enron and its progeny produced tectonic shifts in the corporate law 
landscape. Olson and Briggs examine how the Enron scandal led not only to 
responses in the MBCA, but most importantly, to a shift for the MBCA, so that 
many of its most recent revisions are not enabling and clarifying, but embrace 
important normative standards for directors. These normative standards are 
consistent with McBride’s call that the duty of loyalty should continue to be 
woven throughout the fabric of corporate law. In doing so, one cannot lose sight 
that an over-arching goal of business law is to provide certainty. This should be 
a starting point for the drafters of commercial laws such as the MBCA. Mike 
Dooley, after providing an insightful contrast of the role of standards versus 
rules, closely analyzes the invaluable contributions the MBCA provides by 
blending both standards and rules, sometimes in safe harbors, to address 
uncertainty while at the same time raising standards of conduct in the corporate 
setting.  
One of the biggest challenges facing drafters of corporate statutes is the 
explosion of different business forms. Bill Clark reviews this explosion of 
alternative business entity laws with close attention to the MBCA’s embrace of 
cross-entity and share-exchange provisions. He provides a valuable peek into 
the future in his description of a “hub-and-spoke” approach to entity 
rationalization of the Business Organization Act. Clark opines that this act will 
likely influence drafters of alternative entity acts to follow the MBCA’s 
approach of increasingly providing default rules to guide the organization and 
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operation of unincorporated entities. Again, the themes that pervade this 
comment are innovation, flexibility, and enabling. 
Adding to the voices celebrating the clarity with which the MBCA speaks is 
Bryn Vaaler’s comparative analysis of Delaware’s and the MBCA’s immunity 
shields. He carefully traces the uncertainty that surrounded (and to some extent 
continues to surround) the scope of section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General 
Corporation Law, particularly the slender divide between gross negligence on 
the one hand and on the other, conduct not in “good faith,” or a breach of the 
“duty of loyalty.” The MBCA steered clear of these ambiguous, albeit historic 
expressions. The comment also offers a sobering reminder about the limits of 
any comparison between Delaware and the MBCA; because Delaware’s richer 
jurisprudence provides a veneer not found in other states, one must be careful 
to consider the case law when making such comparisons. This also means that, 
since most states lack such a deep case law, more refined and specific 
terminology that distinguishes the MBCA should have more appeal to those 
states and likely explains why it is the MBCA, and not Delaware, that is copied 
by three-fourths the states. This latter point appears in Norm Veasey’s analysis 
of the contours of the duty of care as set forth by the MBCA and the American 
Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance. He emphasizes that case 
law is the “life blood” of the Delaware Corporate law and, as such, is more 
flexible and balanced than could be expected from a corporate statute. 
Delaware’s statute is the obvious source to compare to the MBCA.  
Within the realm of corporate law, the Delaware General Corporation Law 
and the MBCA are without peers. Even though there continues to be a lively 
debate regarding the competition for corporate charters, Gorris, Hamermesh, 
and Strine’s close analysis of several reform efforts supports the view that 
symbiosis, not competition, best characterizes the relationship of these two acts. 
They offer praise for each body’s drafters—Delaware’s drafters for their 
innovation and the MBCA’s drafters for their refinements.  
Many of the contributors to this symposium stress the benefits of the 
deliberative process that surrounds the work of the Committee on Corporate 
Laws in keeping the MBCA abreast with the rapid developments that pervade 
corporate practice. Larry Scriggins documents the enduring benefits of the 
Committee’s procedures by closely examining the multiple steps the Committee 
pursued in casting aside the former surplus/impairment of capital regime for 
regulating distributions and embracing a radically different regime that, as he 
points out, has not only been widely adopted, but has needed only minor 
tinkering with the language initially introduced in1980. 
The Committee on Corporate Laws has made innumerable contributions 
aside from the MBCA. Marshall Small provides an important historical note by 
tracing the forces and the leadership of several former committee members in 
producing one of the most significant mediums shaping director behavior, the 
Corporate Director’s Guidebook. Like many forces, the Corporate Director’s 
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Guidebook arose from the troubling reports of weak governance in public 
companies that poured forth post-Watergate. Congress acted by passing the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and the ABA acted more deliberately through 
years of effort to identify and then implement a medium to improve director 
oversight. That medium was the publication in 1978 of the Corporate Director’s 
Guidebook (which is about to enter its sixth edition).  
Hillary Sale reminds us that there is more to the meaning of being a public 
corporation than having ownership broadly held and, hence, the forces that 
govern such corporations are broader than their ownership base. We might add 
here that some institutions, namely financial institutions, are so interwoven with 
each other and with the national economy that their governance, as we have 
seen, is a matter of national interest. But even outside the large financial 
institutions, consumers, government, labor, and other organized bodies 
increasingly focus public attention on the behavior of the large corporation. 
This in turn, as she points out, provides an additional hand on the corporate 
governance tiller and is a force that will continue to be reckoned with in future 
drafting efforts of the MBCA and equally so for the Corporate Director’s 
Guidebook. Indeed, governance is moving faster than other areas within the 
purview of the modern corporate statute. On this point, John Wilcox provides 
an interesting approach for directors to better respond to the publicness of their 
oversight of a public company. He sets forth a self-operating approach whereby 
directors will not just undertake certain steps to carry out their oversight 
functions, but will do so in a very public way. In essence, it would not be 
sufficient to merely meet standards for independence and carrying out the 
corporate interests—the directors collectively will be expected to explain 
annually just how they assured their independence and how they believed they 
acted to advance the corporation’s interests. The contributions of Hillary Sale 
and John Wilcox underscore the web of social forces that surround the 
governance of the American corporation. 
The symposium benefits from valuable contributions focused on specific 
issues covered by the corporate statutes. With business organizations becoming 
increasingly complex, the necessity of directors and officers to rely on others 
has risen exponentially. Such reliance, however, comes with risks when that 
reliance is misplaced. Balotti and Shaner closely study the divergent approaches 
the Delaware General Corporation Law and MBCA take in their “reliance safe 
harbors.” In their analysis, they raise an important policy issue of whether 
officers, like directors, should enjoy a reliance safe harbor. Deborah DeMott 
provides a close review of several recent judicial decisions interpreting the right 
of “agents” to obtain indemnification or advancement of expenses. She 
concludes there is a serious misfit of the concept of agent in the indemnification 
context, so that outcomes in these cases have not been well served by attempts 
to apply common-law agency doctrines within the indemnification-corporate 
context.  
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Directors and officers face serious disclosure issues when undertaking 
corporate transactions, particularly those involving public companies, and even 
more so with transactions conditioned on stockholder approval. Stan Keller’s 
article provides a close analysis of the rapidly-developing Delaware case law 
surrounding state-based disclosure obligations. Even though articles elsewhere 
in this issue praise the certainty provided by the MBCA in other regulated 
areas, Stan Keller offers a compelling thesis that in the disclosure area, statutes 
are better to provide baseline requirements, leaving it to the case law to provide 
textured responses to highly fact-based disputes on whether additional 
disclosure is required.  
A central feature of being a fiduciary is the duty of confidentiality; even 
though confidentiality underlies the well-received view of what it means to be a 
fiduciary, this dimension of the fiduciary obligations of directors heretofore has 
been largely unexplored. Cyril Moscow provides a much needed analysis of the 
sources of the obligation of confidentiality and the demands it makes on the 
director. In doing so, he explores the difficulties to be encountered when one 
serves dual-competing directorships or as a director for an identified 
constituency. 
Jim Hanks’s contributions are multiple. He shines a much needed light on 
the circuit split regarding whether cash payments to the target company’s 
stockholders following an acquisition are to be viewed as a disguised 
“distribution” subject and regulated by the distribution provision in section 6.40 
of the MBCA. Hanks also provides a compelling case that the balance sheet test 
for lawful dividends that is embraced by the MBCA in many contexts adds 
little. To this end, while critical of the reasoning in Lerner v. Lerner Corp.,1 
where the court appears to have confused its application of the solvency and 
balance sheet tests, overall he makes the case that the solvency test, alone, has 
much to commend itself to drafters of corporate statutes. Finally, Hanks 
provides a warm, endearing description of one of the giants of corporate law, 
Dean Bayless Manning. 
Two of the comments in this symposium focus on the appraisal remedy and 
provide a close comparative study of the appraisal remedy in the MBCA and 
the Delaware General Corporation Law, but more importantly, identify why 
they each believe the MBCA’s approach embraces sounder public policy. Mary 
Siegel compares the Delaware and the MBCA appraisal remedies in four 
distinct categories: transactions giving rise to the remedy, timing of the 
corporation’s payment pursuant to the remedy, the allocation of costs of the 
proceeding, and the market-out exception. Bob Thompson, focusing 
particularly on the changes introduced to the MBCA in 1999, celebrates the 
clarity of purpose, certainty, and policy choices now embodied in the MBCA’s 
appraisal remedy. In doing so, he nonetheless questions some important 
 
 1. Lerner v. Lerner Corp., 711 A.2d 233 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998). 
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features of both the MBCA and the Delaware provision, particularly the 
wisdom of removing the surviving company’s shareholders from the scope of 
the appraisal statute. 
As we approach the seventh decade of the MBCA, and as one of the articles 
recommends, the Committee must be mindful of its obligation to provide sound 
corporate law for non-public corporations and examine the relationship of the 
MBCA to other entities’ laws. 
Finally, we wish to thank each of the authors for their valuable contributions 
and the excellent editorial work provided by the staff of Law and 
Contemporary Problems. In closing, it has been a real privilege for one of us, 
Herb, to serve as Chair, and the other, Jim, to be among the members, of this 
unique Committee dedicated to improving corporate law in America. 
